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The creation of executive agencies outside core departments has been a major element of 
administrative reforms throughout Europe during the past two decades, driven by a 
managerial logic, which also has been at the core of most academic works on 
“agencification”. In this article, we take a different perspective by focusing on executive 
agencies’ influence in the policy-process. We analyze the policy influence of a large 
executive agency with service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of 
government (Flanders, Belgium). A comparison of the agency’s influence in two major 
policy processes shows that a complex interplay of policy content, patterns of interaction 
and mutual trust with the political leadership and organizational characteristics help 
explaining the observed patterns of influence. The findings also raise normative concerns 
regarding potential problems of disconnecting operations from policy formulation via 
agencification. 
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In many countries throughout Europe, executive agencies have been created 
throughout the past 10-20 years by hiving off organizational units from ministerial 
departments, by separating horizontally integrated functions, or by setting up agencies for 
new tasks (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Kickert & Beck Jørgensen, 1995; OECD, 2002; 
Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2004). In the European 
context, executive agencies are generally characterized by a public law legal status, 
functional separation from their parent ministries or departments, some decision-making 
competencies which are not enjoyed by the parent department itself (e.g. managerial 
decisions), but no statutory independence of the parent department, which may alter the 
organization’ s budget or interfere in operational goals and decisions of the organization 
(Pollitt et al., 2004, p. 10). In parliamentary systems of government, executive agencies 
are primarily controlled by the parent department and its political leadership. Thus, there 
is much less direct parliamentary control of executive agencies like in the US where 
federal agencies are “caught in the middle” (Weingast, 2005) between the influence of 
the President and the two houses of Congress. 
The main reform elements were hiving-off executive organizations from ministerial 
bureaucracies (headed by a politically accountable minister), granting extended levels of 
managerial freedom, and introducing some kind of performance management (Talbot, 
2004a). In line with the managerial focus of agencification, there is a large body of 
literature on these reforms and their effects in terms of public sector performance 
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(Dunsire, Hartley, & Parker, 1991; James, 2003; Pollitt, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; 
Talbot, 2004b; Van Thiel, 2000; Verhoest, 2002).  
In contrast, the implications of agencification reforms on the relationship between 
parent departments and executive agencies in the policy-making process got little 
attention. In this context, Pollitt et al. (2004) argue that splitting policy and operations is 
not a generic feature of agencification reforms and provide several examples of executive 
agencies with either explicit or implicit policy functions. However, assuming that policy 
design is an important function or activity of executive agencies, there is surprisingly 
little research on the empirical dimension of this issue, about the channels of influence 
and about possible explanations for observed (lack of) influence (e.g. Carpenter, 2001; 
Egeberg, 1995; Elder & Page, 1998; Gains, 2003; Jacobsson, 1984; Verschuere, 2009). If 
one of the objectives of agencification reforms has been to strengthen operational matters 
in policy formulation (Gains 2003; Kickert & Beck Jørgensen, 1995), the question 
whether executive agencies actually have some influence in policy decisions and how this 
influence looks like becomes highly relevant. For instance, according to an official report 
on the UK’ s executive agencies (HM Treasury & The Prime Minister's Office of Public 
Services Reform, 2002), executive agencies have become disconnected from their parent 
departments and are “treated as a self-contained project from the business of policy-
making” (p. 11). 
In this article, we address the relationship and interactions between departments and 
their political leadership and executive agencies in the policy-making process in Flanders 
(the largest state of federal Belgium). In 2000, the Flemish government embarked on the 
so-called “Better Governmental Policy” reform which was put into practice in 2006 
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(Rommel & Christiaens, 2009). The principles behind this reform were an increased 
managerial autonomy for executive agencies, combined with a decreased policy-making 
role. Under the so-called ‘primacy of politics’ , policy-making is the prerogative of the 
government and its central administration, while executive agencies should stick to 
implementing these policies (Verschuere, 2009). The question is, however, to what extent 
this rather theoretical role division between policy-making (government and its 
administration) and policy implementation (executive agencies) is observed in reality. 
The research questions are the following: To what extent has the case organization, a 
large executive agency with service delivery tasks, been able to influence key policy 
decisions in its area of activity? How can differences in policy influence among different 
policies and decision-stages be explained? What lessons can be drawn about the policy 
influence of service delivery agencies in parliamentary systems more generally? 
The article is divided into four parts. In the following section, we provide an 
overview of the literature on policy influence of bureaucratic actors and executive 
agencies. Then, we develop an analytical framework for the study of executive agencies’  
policy influence. Next, we present the results of our case study. Finally we discuss our 
findings and propose some directions for further research. 
 
3ROLF\,QIOXHQFHRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH$FWRUV/LWHUDWXUH5HYLHZ
According to a common understanding of democratic governance, administrative 
actors should implement policies that were decided upon by democratically legitimised 
politicians (Peters, 1988; Svara, 2006a). The separation of policy and operations as a 
means for improving management or political control (or both at the same time) is also a 
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classical argument in public sector reform (Hood & Jackson, 1991). This argument is at 
the core of the creation of executive or arm’ s length agencies in many countries. For 
example, in the recent Flemish Better Governmental Policy Reform, it is explicitly 
recognized that autonomous agencies implement the policies decided upon by politicians 
and prepared by central ministries (Verschuere, 2009). 
A large number of studies, however, show that this dichotomous distribution of roles 
of political and administrative actors does not adequately reflect empirical reality 
(Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1981; Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Kingdon, 1984; 
Peters, 1988). Yet, these studies mostly focus on senior bureaucrats in ministerial 
bureaucracies (Aberbach et al., 1981; Derlien, 2003; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975; Olsen, 
1983; Vancoppenolle, 2006), as well as within local government administrations 
(Jacobsen, 2006; Svara, 2006b). Also, the discretion of administrative agencies and 
“ street-level bureaucracy”  (Lipsky, 1980) in the implementation of policies has been 
extensively studied (see deLeon & deLeon, 2002 for an overview of this research). These 
studies show that despite important differences across countries, policy fields, and over 
time regarding the functions performed by politicians and administrators and the 
discretion of public managers, it is virtually impossible to clearly distinguish between 
policy and administration in practice. 
However, this has not kept administrative reformers from creating executive 
agencies, by which “ executive work should be given more attention, more esteem, more 
influence”  (Kickert & Beck Jørgensen, 1995, p. 581). Yet, these authors also warn that 
the result could not only be a stronger consideration of the feasibility of proposed policy 
measures, but a “ dual policy system”  (p. 582) in which agencies develop their own policy 
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proposals which may conflict with the intentions of the political leadership and the parent 
department. 
Against this background, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the 
distribution of functions between ministries on the one hand and executive arm’ s length 
agencies on the other hand, in particular with regard to policy design. A study by Egeberg 
(1995) on two planning processes in the transportation sector in Norway shows that a 
large degree of policy-making took place at the agency level, albeit with some differences 
across the two agencies involved which explain variations in policy influence. In the 
Swedish context, Jacobsson (1984) studied the relative influence of agencies and 
ministries with regard to major policy changes in six policy fields, also showing varied, 
but generally large input of agencies in policy decisions. However, Swedish agencies are 
an exceptional case because of their long agency tradition and a constitutionally 
guaranteed independence of agencies from ministerial oversight (Pierre, 2004). Elder and 
Page (1998) confirm a relatively strong policy influence of Swedish agencies in 
comparison with German agencies, but they also stress major differences and mixed 
levels of policy influence between agencies from the same country and across politico-
administrative contexts. Also, they point the importance of the ministries’  willingness to 
let agencies have a say in policy decisions. Among others, the characteristic function of 
an agency seems to mediate its policy influence (Elder &Page, 1998). Here, it is 
important to note that the effect of task characteristics (e.g. political salience, technical 
complexity, and degree of commercial activities) on agency autonomy and management 
is repeatedly emphasized in the research literature (Pollitt, 2006; Yesilkagit, 2004; Beck 
Jørgensen, Hansen, Antonsen, & Melander, 1998). The effect of the ministry’ s propensity 
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towards including agencies in policy decisions is also emphasized in a study of executive 
agencies in the UK and their relations with ministers and departments (Gains, 2003). This 
study shows that agencies increasingly could influence the development of their 
operational goals. Besides that, some agencies were found to develop distinct policy 
preferences and to translate these preferences into the policy agenda. Carpenter (2001), in 
a historical study of three US agencies shows that agencies may become really distinct 
political entities with a lot of capacity to forge their own preferred policy decision-
making. The embeddedness of these agencies (and their leaders) in networks and the 
organizational capacities that were built-up over time, may give agencies a strong 
reputation and provide them with legitimacy. This reputation and legitimacy enables 
agencies to influence the policy agenda in their favour. 
Besides research that is case study based, recently some efforts have been undertaken 
to measure the discretion of executive agencies via large-N survey research in several 
countries, among others Flanders (Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert, & Verschuere, 2004), the 
Netherlands (Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008), Norway (Lægreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 
2006), Ireland (McGauran, Verhoest, & Humphreys, 2005) and Germany (Bach, 2010). 
In these surveys, the management of executive agencies was asked whether the agency is 
able to make choices about the target groups of the policy, or the policy-instruments to 
apply. For all countries that have been surveyed, it was found that the majority of the 
agencies report to have a large say in the choice of target groups and policy-instruments. 
However, these studies also report clear differences across agencies, as they may take 
these decisions totally autonomously, after having consulted the political oversight 
authorities, or within some conditions set by the parent ministry. 
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The conclusion of this overview of the literature is that most research, small-N or 
large-N, confirms that executive agencies may have significant policy influence in policy 
formulation (yet with clear variation among agencies and countries) and generally seem 
to have substantive discretion when implementing policies. However, the research is very 
diverse and heterogeneous as to methods and concepts used. Many different 
conceptualizations of policy influence are applied, often in a one-dimensional way. For 
instance, the large-N survey research looks at the actors taking policy-decisions about 
target groups and policy instruments, which is a very narrow concept of policy influence 
as the level of discretion agencies have in implementing policy (Ringeling, 1978). Huber 
and Shipan (2002) do this in a rather formalistic way by looking at the level of discretion 
that is left to the agency, after the principals have designed the legislation that should be 
implemented by the executive agency. This legislation may be detailed or not, resulting in 
a certain level of discretion for the agency while implementing policies.  
Other research looks at policy influence as the extent to which agencies are able to 
set the policy agenda themselves, hence deciding on the policies and the very content of 
the policies. Carpenter (2001) applies an extended conceptualization of policy influence 
of public agencies by looking at the autonomy of the agency to take the decisive step 
towards new policy by establishing the policy agenda. Hammond and Knott (1999), in a 
theoretical exercise, take a similar stance, by looking at the influence public managers 
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We bring together these various conceptualizations in a multi-dimensional concept of 
executive agencies’  policy influence. This allows us to take into account the different 
policy-programs in which agencies are involved, the different stages in the policy cycle, 
and the policy-related decisions taken. Also, this broad conceptualization enables us to 
assess the relative influence of executive agencies in decisions taken in different stages of 
different policy-programs, providing a more complete understanding of executive 
agencies’  policy influence, both in terms of policy-formulation, decision-making and 
bureaucratic discretion. We distinguish between four levels of analysis: 
The first dimension of analysis is the policy program. Whereas existing studies either 
focus on policy influence in general (Elder & Page, 1998), or compare the influence of 
different agencies in the development of different policy programs (Egeberg, 1995; 
Jacobsson, 1984), we suggest studying the policy influence of the same agency across 
different policy programs. As we will show below, an agency’ s influence on policy 
decisions may not be the same for all policies within its area of responsibility. 
Second, we look at the agency’ s policy influence from a dynamic perspective by 
referring to the ideal-type policy cycle (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). On the one hand, an 
agency may to a greater or lesser extent be involved in authoritative decisions about the 
content of policy programs (for example choosing desired goals and outputs to be 
delivered by the policy) (Carpenter, 2001; Egeberg, 1995; Hammond & Knott, 1999). On 
the other hand, an agency may also be able to make autonomous decisions while it is 
implementing policies (for example, deciding in individual cases, deciding on how to 
process the policy) (Ringeling, 1978; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Krause, 2003). 
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Third, an agency can have influence with regard to operational, tactical or strategic 
policy-decisions (Verhoest, 2002; Verhoest et al., 2004). Strategic policy decisions deal 
with the general principles, goals and desired societal effects to be achieved with the 
policy. Tactical policy decisions deal with the choice of the quantity and the quality of 
the outputs that should be delivered via the policy-program, the target group, and the 
policy instruments. Finally, operational policy decisions are about procedures and 
activities that have to be performed in order to deliver the intended outputs.  
Fourth, policy influence is a relational concept, as policy-making is a process of 
interaction between various actors with different types of resources. In complex policy 
fields, political actors, administrative actors, and societal actors (e.g. advocacy groups) all 
together have a stake in the policies to be designed. Hence, the influence of these actors 
in shaping policy, will also depend on the level of influence other actors are able to exert. 
In other words, policies are the result of interaction between a variety of actors involved 
in a given policy subsystem (Beck Jørgensen et al., 1998; Gains, 2003; Kingdon, 1984). 
In sum, the agency’ s policy influence is the extent to which it influences the eventual 
content of the decisions that were made about the policy in different stages of the policy 
process (thus not only in the decision-making-phase, but also during the preparation, the 




In the empirical part of this article, we study the policy influence of an executive 
agency with extensive service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of 
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government (Flanders). The research design can be characterized as within-case analysis; 
we analyze two distinct policy programs in which the agency has been involved at 
various decision-stages, and which are implemented by the agency. The case study 
provides a thick description of the agency’ s role in the selected decision-making 
processes. This allows us to draw inferences on the effect of policy program and actor 
constellations on the agency’ s policy influence (strategic, tactical, operational) in the 
different stages of the decision-making processes. We discuss the relevance of our 
empirical findings and develop several theoretical propositions in the final chapter of this 
article. 
The case organization is the Flemish Public Transport Agency (9ODDPVH
9HUYRHUPDDWVFKDSSLM'H/LMQ - VVM), which is responsible for providing bus and tram 
services all over Flanders. VVM is a territorially decentralized organization which has 
one central headquarters and five regional offices. The day-to-day management of the 
agency is performed by a director-general, who also implements the decisions of the 
agency’ s board. The board is headed by a president and consists of key stakeholder 
representatives such as the state government, local and provincial authorities, and the 
unions. The political oversight authority of VVM is the Minister of Mobility and his 
cabinet of politically appointed advisors, whereas the administrative oversight authority 
(composed of permanent civil servants) is the Department of Environment and 
Infrastructure. 
The Flemish Public Transport Agency is one of the largest so-called externally 
autonomous agencies in Flanders; it has over 7000 employees of which 80% are blue 
collar workers such as technicians and bus drivers. The case organization thus represents 
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a class of agencies which typically have extensive service delivery tasks (Verschuere, 
2007). In addition, VMM is a highly politically salient agency: it has a relatively large 
budget, it has more staff than most other public organizations in Flanders, and it 
obviously has a lot of contact with the public (Gains, 2003; Pollitt, 2006). Also, public 
transport traditionally has a high importance as a means of transport in the relatively 
small and densely populated state of Flanders and the neighbouring Brussels region.  
The policy programs were selected after consulting several people closely related to 
the agency. Both programs are relatively recent which makes them easily accessible for 
data collection. Also, both programs affect a high number of citizens and thus are highly 
visible. The “ basic mobility”  program is a major reform of the supply of public transport 
in the whole Flemish region and every single local authority, which defines public 
transport as social right to everybody. To this aim, public transport services are to be 
provided following a set of minimal criteria (e.g. frequency of service, walking 
distances). The policy line of basic mobility was put on the political agenda in 1995 for 
the first time, it was formalized in a parliamentary decree in 2001, and the 
implementation of the policy was nearly finished in 2006. The second policy-program 
” Pegasus”  mainly affects the region of the Flemish Diamond and the people who live and 
work there. The Flemish Diamond is the metropolitan area between the cities of Antwerp, 
Ghent, Brussels and Leuven, and it is the economic centre of Flanders in which 57% of 
the Flemish population lives and 60% of the total Flemish workforce is employed. The 
key objective of Pegasus is to increase the region’ s accessibility by strengthening public 
transport. The so-called “ Minder Hinder”  measures in Antwerp are a major 
implementation project of Pegasus. “ Minder Hinder”  is the total of measures taken to 
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decrease the negative effects of the renovation of the ring road around Antwerp, one of 
the busiest highways in Europe. This renovation decreased the ringroad’ s capacity by 
15%, hence large traffic problems were expected. The problem of the future accessibility 
of Flanders’  large cities was perceived as a serious issue in 1999 for the first time, the 
implementation of Minder Hinder started in 2004, and this paper investigates this process 
until 2005 when a decision to continue the project was taken. In terms of their relative 
budgetary weight, both programs are largely similar: basic mobility and the Minder 
Hinder measures stand for respectively 12% and 10% of VVM’ s annual budget of 700 
million Euros in 2004. 
The crucial difference between these policies is their level of detail, as basic mobility 
is much more formalized and detailed than Pegasus. The bottom line is that basic 
mobility is based on a decree that was voted in Parliament, which was followed by 
several executive decisions. These regulations arrange the way basic mobility is to be 
implemented in the field with a high level of detail. Next to that, a parliamentary decree 
implies a binding commitment which has direct political and budgetary consequences. 
Basic mobility is defined as a citizen’ s right and has to be implemented within a given 
time limit and budget. In contrast, the policy of Pegasus is only formalized to a small 
extent. Its formal status is a policy plan that has been taken up in the governmental 
agreement implying a commitment by the government to take initiatives towards 
implementing this policy. Such a commitment has less direct consequences than a decree 
as it does not imply any legal obligations. Next to that, the implementation of the projects 
under the Pegasus-umbrella is specified in a much less detailed way compared to basic 
mobility. The only piece of formal regulation is the governmental decision on “ net-
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management”  that accompanies the decree on basic mobility. This policy defines 
procedures and quality criteria upon which the public transport network needs to be 
organized. Thus, all public transport implementation projects need to follow this 
methodology, including Minder Hinder.  
The research process was guided by the following questions: (1) What are the key 
policy-decisions (and what is the content of these decisions) taken in the different phases 
of the policy process? (2) To what extent did the agency have a decisive influence upon 
the content of these decisions? And, what other actors were involved in the policy-
decision making process?  
In terms of data collection, the case study relies on an extensive document analysis, 
including parliamentary notes (parliamentary questions and transcripts of parliamentary 
discussions), internal notes of meetings (e.g. the board of VVM), internal notes of the 
monthly meetings between ministerial cabinet (political advisors), oversight 
administration and VVM, legislation (decrees, ministerial and governmental decisions), 
scientific studies, and anonymous documents (of which the author could be identified by 
asking the involved actors). Also, semi-structured expert interviews (N=32) were used to 
validate the findings. The respondents were selected for their expertise in the policy 
programs under scrutiny, and the sample included people from VVM (management, 
board, provincial entities), the ministerial cabinets of mobility, members of parliament, 
people from the parent department, independent experts and stakeholders. The following 
section summarizes the empirical findings. 
 
(PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
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In the SUHSDUDWLRQSKDVH of both policy programs, the key-decisions were mainly 
strategic (identifying problems, formulating objectives, and defining desirable policy 
effects). In the case of basic mobility the major objective is giving equal access to 
mobility to everyone. Next to that, an intention to hardwire the policy of basic mobility in 
a parliamentary decree was agreed upon. In this stage of the policy-process, the decisive 
actor was the Minister of Mobility, and the influence of the agency (VVM) in these 
preparatory decisions was rather low.  
In the case of the Pegasus-plan, the decision revolved around guaranteeing the 
accessibility of the economic heart of Flanders, by means of increasing public transport 
supply. The role of public transport in solving mobility problems was explicitly 
recognized, and plans were drafted to increase the capacity of public transport in this 
area. VVM was a strong advocate for the development of comprehensive public transport 
planning in the metropolitan areas, and was very active with regard to contracting 
research studies that would underpin these plans. Thus, together with the ministerial 
cabinet as the main actor and the administrative oversight authority, VVM had a large 
influence in the strategic vision-building of mobility in the Flemish Diamond.  
In the GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSKDVH of both basic mobility and Pegasus, the key decisions 
are about the quantity and quality of public transport service delivery, which are mostly 
tactical policy-decisions. The parliamentary decree of basic mobility defines general 
principles for service delivery, which are operationalized via governmental decisions on 
norms for basic mobility (e.g. frequency of services, distance between bus stops) and 
quality criteria for developing the public transport network (the so-called net-
management decision). During this phase, the Minister of Mobility and his advisors made 
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the most important decisions, whereas the influence of the agency in these decisions 
varied. During the first period of the decision-making stage, in which the decree and 
governmental decision on basic mobility were decided upon, the influence of VVM was 
rather small, it had mainly an advisory role (e.g. commenting on draft versions of the 
decree), and its suggestions were not always followed. Later on however, during the 
decision-process on net-management, the input of the agency was much larger. In 
particular, VVM coordinated the drafting process of the corresponding governmental 
decision in which also the cabinet and permanent ministry staff was involved.  
The picture is rather different for the decision-making on Pegasus, in which VVM 
had a major influence (the plan was essentially prepared by VVM’ s provincial entities). 
This plan defines the future ideal public transport service delivery in the Flemish 
Diamond by making choices about the outputs (level and type of future public service 
delivery) that will be necessary to reach the goal of accessibility of the region. Also, 
together with the Minster of Mobility and his cabinet, and by obtaining the support of 
parliament and local governments, VVM successfully managed to have the plan included 
in the policy program of a newly elected government.  
During the LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ of basic mobility, two different kinds of operational 
decisions were made. The first types of decisions pertain to the implementation-
trajectory. As the policy of basic mobility needed to be implemented in every local 
community of Flanders, decisions had to be made about the sequence of implementation, 
as budgetary constraints made the simultaneous implementation of the policy in all local 
communities impossible. During the first phase of the programming, the minister was the 
key actor to decide (i.e. making priority-lists), and the input of VVM was rather low. This 
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changed in later phases of the programming, when VVM was able to exert real influence 
in the setting of priority-lists for implementation, whereas the influence of the minister 
and the cabinet decreased substantially. The second kind of decisions in the 
implementation phase is about how to put into practice the decree in the individual local 
communities, which includes defining bus-trajectories, choosing types of public transport 
vehicles etc. In these kinds of operational decisions, VVM has been dominant from day 
one, because of its operational knowledge.  
In contrast to the policy of basic mobility, no immediate commitment was made for 
implementing Pegasus. One window of opportunity was opened in the early 2000’ s with 
the infrastructure-works of the Antwerp ring road. During these works, traffic capacity 
decreased considerably, and as a solution the public transport capacity was to be 
increased (the “ Minder Hinder” -plan). As the plans for increasing public transport 
capacity in this area were already there (as part of the larger Pegasus-plan), these 
measures could immediately be implemented. VVM’ s policy proposal was entirely 
accepted by the government. 
During the HYDOXDWLRQ of basic mobility, choices were made about the continuation of 
the policy, without questioning or altering the output norms, nor the goals of the policy. 
The government decided to continue basic mobility, but also to be more realistic and 
pragmatic in applying the strict norms of the decree (e.g. about bus frequencies and 
vehicles). This evaluation took place in 2005 after increasing parliamentary critique 
because of the large budgetary impact of the policy. The decision to continue with the 
implementation on a more pragmatic basis (i.e. taking into consideration budgetary 
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constraints) was jointly made by the agency and the minister and his cabinet, based on an 
in-house evaluation report by VVM.  
In the evaluation-phase of Minder Hinder (Pegasus), the focus predominantly was on 
tactical policy-choices, i.e. whether the policy output (public transport services) had 
reached the defined goals. Also, decisions were taken about the future level of public 
transport service delivery. The implementation of Minder Hinder turned out to be a big 
success, as the number of public transport users had increased considerably, and the 
expected traffic problems during the works on the ring road were not as severe as 
expected. Following this positive evaluation, VVM could manage to have the decision 
forged that these – initially temporarily – measures became permanent at a somewhat 
lower level.  
 
&RPSDULQJDJHQF\LQIOXHQFHLQWZRSROLF\SURJUDPVNH\ILQGLQJV
Without doubt, we observe a lot of variation regarding the Flemish Public Transport 
Agency’ s influence in the decision processes under scrutiny. Three findings deserve 
particular attention: First, in the preparation and decision-making phases, the influence of 
VVM on the policy of Pegasus was generally higher compared to basic mobility. VVM 
had a large influence on the decisions concerning the vision and principles of maintaining 
the accessibility of the Flemish Diamond and the role of the public transport therein. The 
policy-vision which was mainly prepared by VVM was eventually included in a 
politically approved plan.  
In contrast, VVM hardly had any influence on the vision-building about the role of 
the public transport in the policy of basic mobility. Furthermore, VVM had no say in the 
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decisions on specific norms for service delivery in the decree and the governmental 
decision on basic mobility. The only exception to this picture is the governmental 
decision on net-management which was written by VVM, defining the quality of the 
public transport network in Flanders. In the case of Pegasus, the executive agency 
managed to have its own policy-vision politically approved and formalized. In the case of 
basic mobility, the agency merely had an advisory role in the decision-making process, in 
which it would comment on draft policy documents and suggest changes to some details. 
Thus, also taking into consideration the different time periods in which the policy lines 
under scrutiny were prepared and formulated, we find that the policy influence of VVM 
regarding policy preparation and determination clearly increased during the period of 
analysis. 
Second, the influence of VVM in the implementation- and evaluation-phases of both 
policy programs is rather high. This finding is in line with the rhetoric of agencification 
reforms, according to which executive agencies should have substantial operational 
discretion in order to provide their services in an efficient and effective manner (Pollitt et 
al., 2004). In the case of basic mobility, VVM designed the implementation projects and 
carried them out the field. This often happened in a pragmatic way, not rigidly adhering 
to the norms for service delivery that have been formalized in the decree. However, the 
minister and his cabinet controlled this process in its early stages when potentially 
conflict-ridden decisions on the sequence of implementation had to be taken. Similarly, in 
the case of Minder Hinder (Pegasus), the agency had considerable degrees of freedom in 
the design and implementation of specific public transport measures in the field, which 
arguably were even higher compared to basic mobility: the agency could decide, within 
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the budgets accorded, by what kind of service delivery a defined policy-goal could be 
reached (and how the services needed to be delivered). 
A third general observation is that in most policy phases studied, the cabinet of the 
Minister of Mobility (i.e. the political oversight authority) was the most influential actor, 
whereas the influence of the oversight ministry in the policy-decisions was generally low. 
This observation reflects characteristic features of the policy-making process in Flanders, 
which is dominated by large ministerial cabinets of advisers (personal political 
secretariats of the minister). Thus, the agency’ s policy influence in the formulation and 
decision stages primarily depends on the ministerial cabinet’ s willingness to include the 
agency in the decision-process and to accepting the agency’ s suggestions.1 The basic 
mobility policy was rather controversial among the coalition parties, and the minister had 
a strong interest in developing this policy together with his cabinet, hence excluding other 
actors that may potentially dilute the initial policy objectives. 
 
7KHRUHWLFDO'LVFXVVLRQ
The empirical analysis shows that agency influence in policy decisions varies 
between policy lines, phases in the policy process, and the actor constellations at a given 
point of time. For instance, VVM was very much involved in developing the broad policy 
objectives of Pegasus, but was virtually absent in setting the strategic lines of the policy 
of basic mobility. In addition, we find that the agency’ s policy influence in the 
preparation and decision phases increased over time. Hence, in analytical terms, 
executive agencies’  policy influence may be explained by the interplay of policy 
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characteristics and features of the actors involved (here: executive agency and the 
minister and his cabinet of advisors).  
The observation that agency autonomy may vary across policy issues, and that 
explanations for levels of policy autonomy should be considerate of this, has also been 
shown by Hammond (2003) who found that the “ preference-variable”  (the extent to 
which actors in the decision making process prefer a certain policy or not) may vary per 
issue-area (or per policy program) and that as a result the bureaucratic autonomy of the 
agency may be expected to vary as well. Thus, the preference distribution of the actors 
involved will help explaining levels of policy influence. In a similar vein, Peters (2001, p. 
222) argues that “ bureaucratic organizations frequently have their own well-developed 
ideas about what government should do”  which he terms “ agency ideology” . This 
ideology may come in a “ soft version”  which emphasizes continuity and the way things 
are currently done in the organization, but it also may take the form of a ” hard version”  
which essentially consists of a setting new policy priorities based on the bureaucracy’ s 
long-standing expertise in the field. The case study provides evidence of both types of 
bureaucratic policy preferences. In the following, we discuss three policy-related 
explanations for the level of agency influence in a certain program or in a certain policy-
phase (Verschuere, 2006). 
First, the DWWLWXGHRIWKHDJHQF\WRZDUGVWKHSROLF\ or WKH´ILW´RIWKHDJHQF\LGHRORJ\
DQGWKHSURSRVHGSROLF\ is a factor that seems highly program-related. We may assume 
that one and the same agency may have a positive attitude towards one policy-program in 
which it is engaged, while it may have negative attitudes towards other policy programs. 
The factor ‘attitude’  can thus help to explain why the VVM exerted more influence in the 
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policy of Pegasus, compared to the policy of basic mobility. VVM was rather sceptical 
towards the policy of basic mobility, because its ideas of the (social) role of public 
transport and about how public transport should be delivered and organized, conflicted 
with the basic tenets of basic mobility. To the contrary, the strong influence of VVM in 
the policy of Pegasus can be explained, at least partly, by the enthousiastic attitude of 
VVM towards Pegasus, because extended public transport in densely populated areas has 
always been a priority for VVM. Moreover, we find that the agency ideology is most 
important in the preparatory stage of the policy. This can perhaps be explained by the fact 
that attitudes of the agency towards the policy program will mainly be formed during the 
early preparation-phases of the policy, when the policy is designed. 
Also the ³IXQFWLRQDOLW\IRUWKHDJHQF\´RUWKHH[SHFWHGJDLQVRUORVVHV to be involved 
in the decision making process may be an important factor for determining agency’ s level 
of influence. What functionality means will be determined by specific features of the 
policy-program at stake. In the case of Pegasus, the early policy plans seemed to offer a 
window of opportunity for VVM to realize what they desired for a long time: extended 
public transport in the metropolitan areas. In contrast, VVM to a certain extent feared the 
basic mobility policy, because it proposed nothing less than a revolution in the 
organization of public transport, as it would have shifted from a demand-based to a 
supply-based provision of public transport services. Further, in the case the policy is 
prepared by the agency (thus reflecting the policy-preferences of the agency), it can be 
advantageous for the agency to be strongly involved in the determination-process of the 
policy, to guard that the initial policy proposals are also politically approved accordingly 
(e.g. Pegasus). In the case the policy has been prepared mainly by the oversight 
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authorities, it may be functional for the agency to try to “ adapt”  initial policy proposals 
made by others to their own preferences (e.g. basic mobility). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the mechanism of “ functionality”  was found to play a large 
role in those policy-phases when binding decisions were made, such as the determination-
phase and the evaluation-phase of the policy. Here, the specific task of the executive 
agency seems to play an important role. The empirical findings suggest that executive 
agencies with extensive service delivery functions have a high stake in keeping their 
policy environment in a way that enables them to perform their tasks as smooth as 
possible. In other words, in order to produce their services effectivly (i.e. in line with the 
“ agency ideology” ), this type of agency has a high interest in influencing key policy 
decisions in its favour. Yesilkagit (2004) emphasizes that service-delivery agencies with 
a large number of middle rank staff are especially keen on working conditions with little 
red tape and being detached from the ministerial department where their work has a 
relatively low esteem. Thus, we draw the conclusion that service delivery agencies are 
more inclined towards influencing policy decisions than agencies with other core tasks 
(e.g. agencies providing office-based public services). 
Third, it may be ³IXQFWLRQDOIRUWKHRYHUVLJKWDXWKRULWLHV´ to have the agency 
involved in the decision making process or to exclude it from those decisions. Again, we 
assume that features of the policy-program are highly important whether agency-
involvement in the decision making process will be considered as being functional by the 
oversight authorities or not. In policy-programs that are high priority for the oversight 
authorities and that are contested in the (political) environment, involvement of other 
actors (such as the agency) in the decision making process may be considered 
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“ dysfunctional”  for the oversight authorities (because they want to be sure that their 
preferred policy is not be blurred too much by other actors during the decision making 
process). This is also one of the reasons why VVM was not very much involved in the 
early stages of basic mobility: the minister wanted to take advantage of the momentum, to 
forge a highly politically salient policy. Besides that, knowing that VVM initially was 
sceptical towards the policy, the minister had no interest in having the agency involved in 
designing the policy. In low priority, low political salience programs, the incentive of the 
oversight authorities to steer the agency may be much lower, potentially resulting in large 
levels of autonomy for the agency (Gains, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2004). Also, it may be 
functional for the minister to rely on the expertise of the agency to develop policies. This 
was the case with Pegasus, when the minister was dependent on the knowledge of the 
VVM, as expert in public transport delivery, to draft the plans for extending public 
transport. 
Yet, whether an executive agency is able to deliver policy work also depends on the 
organization’ s structural capacity. In basic terms, structural capacity refers to the 
available resources – more precisely, the number of qualified staff – for a given activity 
in an organization (Egeberg, 1999). A higher capacity to perform policy work may enable 
an executive agency to have policy proposals ready when a window of opportunity opens 
(ibid.), and this is exactly what happened in the case of the measures to maintain the 
accessibility of metropolitan areas in our case study. During the period of analysis, the 
agency’ s capacity related to policy activities clearly increased. When the policy of basic 
mobility was formulated (around 2000), the capacities of the agency to perform policy 
work were only weakly developed. Following the advice of an independent audit report, 
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an internal policy cell was created in 1998, which later was incorporated as research 
division into the main organizational structure of the (central) agency. Closely related, at 
the time when basic mobility was formulated, the agency saw its operation mission 
primarily as operating trams and buses, rather than doing policy work. Also, as a result of 
a major restructuring at the beginning of the 1990s, the agency was focusing much more 
on internal organizational issues than policy design. Another aspect is the increase of 
highly skilled staff between 1999 and 2004 (relative to the number of blue collar 
workers). Here, following a change of the political leadership in the ministry, the 
ministerial cabinet of advisors was replaced, and several of the highly skilled advisors 
that have been dealing with basic mobility (among other policies) started working for the 
agency. Thus, when the Pegasus policy was put into place (around 2002), the agency had 
the necessary structural capacity to deliver policy work.  
Also, the agency increasingly perceived itself as a poliy unit in the field of public 
transport, thus moving beyond its initial role as bus and tram operator (Verschuere, 
2006). In other words, doing policy work had become appropriate behaviour (March & 
Olsen, 2006) for the agency over time. The degree of appropriateness of doing policy 
work seems to vary across executive agencies and countries (Elder & Page, 1998; Gains, 
2003), and the way in which such norms of appropriateness develop and change merits 
further empirical enquiries (see Carpenter, 2001 for such an analysis in the US context). 
Another highly relevant factor for interactions between oversight authorities and 
executive agencies is the degree of mututal trust. In the Flemish context, the mutual trust 
between executive agencies and ministerial cabinets is fairly high, as opposed to a low-
trust relationship between executive agencies and the oversight administration (Rommel 
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& Christiaens, 2009). A high frequency of personal interactions (often including the 
minister), former cabinet staff working in the agencies and party political congruence 
between cabinets and agency staff have been identified as key explanatory factors (ibid.). 
With regard to our case study, we may conclude that the agency’ s reputation as a 
trustworthy agent for policy implementation increased over time and eased its high level 
of influence on the Minder Hinder policy. On the one hand, the agency successfully 
implemented the basic mobility policy which is in conflict with its prevailing agency 
ideology of demand-based service delivery. Hence, the agency signalled trustworthyness 
to the political oversight authority as a fairly neutral implementing agent. On the other 
hand, the agency displayed a rather low level of trust towards the minister when the basic 
mobility policy was formulated. The agency had suffered from financial cutbacks in the 
years before, and hence was rather sceptical whether the political leadership would stick 
to its promises regarding the financing of the basic mobility policy (which it did). 
Finally, the research also sheds light on the perennial question of delegation and 
political control of the executive which has been widely debated, especially in the US 
context (Weingast, 2005; Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008). The case study shows that the 
ministry’ s political leadership (which is typical for Flanders) and the ministerial 
bureaucracy are the key principals of the executive agency (which is quite similar to other 
European countries; Döhler, 2005; Pollitt et al., 2004; Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008). In 
the context of parliamentary government, the involvement of executive agencies in policy 
decisions by the oversight authorities may be considered as a mechanism of political 
control (Döhler, 2005). The inclusion of executive agencies and their policy preferences 
in policy decisions thus reduces the potential for bureaucratic drift in the implementation 
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process (ibid.). Also, the observed patterns of interaction are a mechanism by which the 
minister’ s policy preferences are transferred to the executive agency, which in the daily 
buisness pay significantly less attention to signals from the political leadership compared 
to ministerial bureaucracies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). This suggests that including 
executive agencies in policy decisions increases political control of the bureacracy, rather 
than the other way round. 
 
&RQFOXVLRQ
 This article wants to make a case for bringing politics into the study of executive 
agencies and delegated government. With the rise of delegated government in many 
Western countries, and the subsequent academic interest in this phenomenon, public 
agencies have been studied mostly from a managerial angle, whereas the impact of those 
changes on the relationship between policy and management has not been a major 
research topic. This might be surprising, given the important position of many executive 
agencies in the public domain, and the fact that they are democratically accountable via 
elected politicians. The sparse literature and our case study show that executive agencies 
may play a considerable policy-role in parliamentary systems of government, in 
interaction with elected officials and their support staff. The extent to which an executive 
agency is involved in policy-making depends on several factors, like the specific content 
of the policy-program, the phase of the policy-making process, the agency’ s main task, 
and the interests of both political actors and executive agencies, and the perceived threats 
and opportunities in order to further those interests. 
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However, there is a need to further explore the context in which executive agencies 
perform policy functions. In the theoretical discussion we propose some factors that 
emerged from the case, and that may be helpful for explaining why agencies are involved 
in the policy-making process, taking into consideration that agencies are confronted with 
various policy programs at the same time, and that policy influence may occur in the 
various stages of the policy cycle.  
From a normative point of view, the research shows that the functional separation 
between policy-making and implementation, often advocated by reformers, is not always 
empirically valid, and perhaps also not so desirable. Closer cooperation between 
government and implementing agencies in policy-making may be advantageous for 
several reasons. First, involving policy-implementers in the policy design can improve 
the quality of the policy, because implementing actors, from their experience in the field, 
can provide policy decision-makers with reality checks. Executive agencies possess 
substantive professional and experiential expertise which is not readily available in the 
ministerial bureaucracy (Beck Jørgensen et al., 1998; Elder & Page, 1998). In some 
cases, government may be highly dependent on the agencies’  expertise to develop 
realistic and effective policies, as the case study shows. In this context, further research 
should investigate the effect of task characteristics on executive agencies’  policy 
influence, which is a question beyond the scope of this article. Second, engaging policy 
implementers in the policy may prevent potential adverse behaviour of administrative 
actors in the implementation-phase (Döhler, 2005). Thus, in situations when the 
ministerial bureaucracy tends to keep policy development at distance from executive 
agencies, problems of disconnection and between both levels are likely to occur (HM 
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Treasury & The Prime Minister’s Office of Public Services Reform, 2002). Third, 
cooperation in all stages of the policy cycle can increase trust levels between principals 
(government) and agents (implementing agencies), and the executive agencies may also 
use trust-building strategies towards their principals (Rommel & Christiaens, 2009). This 
implies that the relationship between principal and agent not necessarily has to be 
regarded in a negative sense (e.g. control for adverse behaviour), but that principals and 
agents can build strong trust relationships through cooperation and communication. 
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1
 In other parliamentary systems without ministerial cabinets like Germany, this type of 
interaction takes place directly between the ministerial bureaucracy and the agency 
(Döhler, 2005; Elder & Page, 1998). 
